- The most noticeable shifts in public opinion over the past year—marked by intense developments in the Russian-Ukrainian war—relate to perceptions of responsibility for the war and expectations regarding the shape of future peace.
There is a growing share of citizens who place blame on all parties to the conflict—Russia, Ukraine, and the West—while the proportion of those who blame only the Russian government under Putin has declined from 72% in February 2023 to 54.1% in September 2024.
The share of Ukrainians who would accept peace only on the basis of the aggressor’s complete and unconditional surrender, including full compensation and reparations, has also dropped—from 42% last September to 31.9% now.
Overall, public opinion regarding the origins, course, and potential end of the war is evolving rapidly and remains highly dynamic. - The greatest achievement of the Ukrainian people, and the main source of national pride, is seen in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and their valor in the Russian-Ukrainian war—recognized by 66.6% of respondents.
This is the highest figure recorded in the entire history of the survey.
In general, citizens increasingly take pride in events and figures symbolizing Ukraine’s resistance and agency: the struggles of Soviet-era human rights defenders, leaders of the national liberation movement, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the volunteer movement, and Ukraine’s international recognition.
Over 14% of respondents consider the election of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as President of Ukraine to be a national achievement worthy of pride. - The war has significantly altered the regional landscape of public opinion.
There is no longer a clear divide between East and West, nor is there a consolidated position among what Russian propaganda once labeled the “South-East” of Ukraine.
Today, regional differences are more fluid and complex. This is partly due to large-scale internal migration, and partly due to a fundamental shift in the views of residents in formerly pro-Russian regions regarding Ukraine’s future and relations with the aggressor state.
People in different regions now construct the national narrative differently, but the transformation of national consciousness remains an ongoing process.
In regional terms, residents of the South and West tend to hold more radical views on many issues, while those in Central Ukraine are generally more moderate. - The war is reshaping the culture of attitudes toward mental health in Ukraine.
On one hand, there is a significant risk of stigmatizing those who have taken part in combat, particularly in relation to mental health. Over 86% of respondents believe that all such veterans require specialized psychological support.
On the other hand, the public is highly alert to the war’s impact on psychological well-being: more than 80% report seeing signs of declining mental health in their immediate environment.
Today, there is a societal consensus that mental health should not be neglected during wartime in favor of “more important” matters—around 64% of respondents agree with this view.
Methodology
A nationwide public opinion survey was conducted by the Institute for Social and Political Psychology of the National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine in collaboration with the Association of Political Psychologists of Ukraine from September 17 to 28, 2024, as part of the annual monitoring of public attitudes. The sample is representative of the adult population of Ukraine aged 18 and over. The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews. A total of 1,157 respondents were surveyed across all regions of Ukraine, excluding temporarily occupied territories. The margin of error is ±3.2%.
For the analysis of regional specifics, Ukraine was conditionally divided into the following macro-regions:
- Western: Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts;
- Central: Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv oblasts, and the city of Kyiv;
- Eastern: Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv oblasts;
- Southern: Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts.
Results
Since the onset of Russian aggression in 2014, the share of citizens affirming their support for the 1991 Declaration of Independence of Ukraine has consistently exceeded 90%. In 2023 and 2024, this indicator reached its highest levels since observations began—97.7% and 97.2%, respectively. For comparison, in 2011, the share of affirmative responses was nearly 20 percentage points lower at 78.4%.
Support for the idea of Ukrainian statehood has remained steadily high across all regions over the past decade of war. The one exception is the South, where public opinion has shown some fluctuation: 96.6% of residents affirmed the Declaration in 2014, 78.8% in 2015, 97.1% in 2019, and 88.9% in 2024.
The proportion of respondents who believe Ukraine is currently a truly independent state (41.7%) is nearly equal to the share of those who believe it is not (39.3%). Regional differences in opinion are significant: in the South, over half of respondents (58.5%) view Ukraine as genuinely independent, while only a quarter (26.7%) do not. In contrast, the situation in the East is reversed—only 26.2% agree, while 52.1% disagree.
At the same time, a clear majority of citizens—never below 70% since 2014 and 78.7% in 2024—believe that Ukraine is capable of existing as a truly independent state. Confidence is highest in the West (94.1%). Confidence levels in the South and East have fluctuated over time, not always in sync. At the time of the latest survey, more than 75% of respondents in both regions agreed that Ukraine has the capacity to exist as a fully sovereign nation.
Among the achievements of the Ukrainian people most worthy of national pride, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and their valor in the Russian-Ukrainian war are the undisputed leader. As of the most recent survey, 66.6% of respondents selected this achievement—up from 57.3% in 2023 and just 36.4% in 2021.
Other historical achievements have also grown in significance:
- The struggle of Ukrainian human rights defenders against the totalitarian regime (such as Petro Hryhorenko, Lev Lukianenko, Mykola Rudenko, Viacheslav Chornovil) was cited by 36% in 2024 (up from 24.7% in 2023);
- The activities of leaders of the Ukrainian national liberation movement (Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Symon Petliura, etc.) were chosen by 28.4% in 2024, compared to 21.9% in 2023;
- The struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) was selected by 26.6% in 2024—a record high;
- Victory in World War II was considered a source of national pride by 27.1% of respondents, up from 21.0% the previous year.
This increase is largely due to changing attitudes in the South (from 11.7% in 2023 to 24.4% in 2024) and the West (from 11.7% in 2023 to 23.6% in 2024).
Residents of different regions of Ukraine understand national pride in different ways and take pride in different things. For example, in the southern oblasts, the greatest sources of pride are the achievements of Ukrainian athletes (61.5%) and the country’s international recognition (55.6%). In the West, the top source of national pride is the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine (69.4%). In the East and Center, the Armed Forces of Ukraine lead the symbolic ranking of achievements (63.8% and 74.1%, respectively). Among residents of the eastern regions, only around 16% express pride in the struggle of Soviet-era Ukrainian human rights activists or the leaders of the national liberation movement.
More than 70% of respondents fully or mostly support the law banning the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and other religious organizations controlled by the aggressor state across the entire territory of Ukraine. Only 15% oppose it. However, regional differences on this issue are not as pronounced as the differences among followers of different religious denominations.
The highest level of support is observed among adherents of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (87.1%) and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (82.8%), while the lowest is among followers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Among supporters of other denominations or those unaffiliated with any church, every fifth respondent is indifferent to the issue.
Currently, only 54.1% of respondents place the blame for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine squarely on the Russian government led by Vladimir Putin. In February 2023, this figure was 72%.
Only 2.6% blame the current Ukrainian government, 5.7% blame Ukrainian political leaders across all years of independence, and 3.2% blame the United States, the EU, and NATO.
By contrast, nearly a quarter (24.1%) now believe that all parties—Russia, Ukraine, and the West—bear responsibility for the war’s outbreak, a significant increase from 13.7% in February 2023.
There are no drastic regional differences in this regard, although in the Central region, the share of those who blame Russia as the primary aggressor falls below 50% (48.7%).
Ukrainians are gradually lowering their expectations regarding how the war might end.
The proportion of those who would accept peace only on the condition of the aggressor’s full and unconditional capitulation—including the payment of complete compensation and reparations—has declined from 42% in 2023 to 32% in 2024.
Meanwhile, support has grown more evenly for alternative, more compromise-oriented peace scenarios:
- A return to Ukraine’s 1991 borders, including Donbas and Crimea (up from 25.1% in 2023 to 27.3% in 2024);
- A ceasefire and mutual withdrawal of troops from the front line (10.9% to 14.6%);
- The return of territories occupied since February 24, 2022, to Ukrainian control (9.2% to 11.5%);
- Formalizing the current line of contact as the state border with the aggressor state, if it paves the way for Ukraine’s accession to NATO and the EU (2.9% to 4.8%).
Support for the maximalist vision of peace is lowest in the East (25.9%) and South (20.7%).
Interestingly, support for a return to the 1991 borders—including Donbas and Crimea—as an acceptable condition for peace is highest in the East (39.3%) and lowest in the West (19.6%).
Less than one-third of respondents (30.9%) viewed the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ military operation in Russia’s Kursk region as a turning point in the war that strengthened Ukraine’s position. About a quarter (23.9%) believe the operation had no effect on the course of the war. One in eight (12.4%) fear it may have weakened Ukraine’s position. A significant portion—32.3%—have no clear opinion on the matter.
Ukrainian society is deeply concerned about the war’s impact on mental health, especially the psychological well-being of service members. More than half of respondents (51.7%) fully agree, and nearly 35% mostly agree, that all soldiers who have participated in combat require specialized psychological assistance. This belief—which may risk becoming a form of stigma—is particularly pronounced in the South, where over 97% of respondents fully or mostly agree with the statement.
More than 80% of respondents fully or mostly agree that since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the mental health of their relatives and acquaintances has significantly worsened. Only one in ten (10.7%) say they do not see signs of such deterioration in their immediate environment. In the South, the perception of declining mental health is especially acute, with nearly 90% noticing significant deterioration, while in the East the figure is slightly lower at 75.2%, still above the national average.
However, a quarter of respondents (25.1%) believe that mental health should not be a priority during wartime, as there are more important concerns. Nearly 64% disagree. On this issue, generational differences are more pronounced than regional ones. Among respondents aged 18–29, 72% reject the idea of postponing care for mental health in favor of “more urgent” wartime needs, compared to just over half (57.4%) of those aged 56 and older.
Full survey results are available at the following link:
https://ispp.org.ua/2024/10/03/gromadsko-politychna-sytuacziya-v-ukraiinirezultaty-monitoryngu-gromadskoii-dumky-u-veresni-2024-r/