Press Release – The State of Public Consciousness in the Fourth Year of Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion: Results of Public Opinion Monitoring
The survey was conducted by the Institute for Social and Political Psychology of the National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine in cooperation with the Association of Political Psychologists of Ukraine. The research was carried out using face-to-face interviews between March 15–25, 2025. A total of 1,213 respondents aged 18 and over were surveyed in territories under the control of the Government of Ukraine. The sample is representative of the adult population of Ukraine. The sampling error is 3.2%.
The analysis of regional differences in public opinion is based on grouping oblasts into four macro-regions:
- Western region (Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts);
- Central region (Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv oblasts, as well as the city of Kyiv);
- Eastern region (Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv oblasts);
- Southern region (Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts).
The data are also differentiated by respondents’ political preferences, based on the question: “If the presidential election were held next Sunday, which of the following candidates would you vote for?” The combined share of responses for Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and Petro Poroshenko amounts to 52.8% of the sample.
The current results are compared to data collected in February 2022, just before the beginning of the full-scale invasion.
KEY FINDINGS
- Public opinion in Ukraine, in the fourth year of Russia’s full-scale military invasion, is marked by contradictory uncertainty.
On the one hand, a strong societal consensus remains intact regarding national identity, the value of Ukrainian independence, freedom, patriotism, and the rejection of the enemy and its worldview. On the other hand, several emerging trends may point to a significant decline in Ukrainian society’s capacity for resilience and mobilization. One could say that public opinion stands at a bifurcation point—between two divergent future scenarios: one of increasing resilience and unity, and another of weakening foundations of national resistance.
For example, 74% of respondents (the same proportion as last year) agree with the statement: “Only Ukrainian patriots can lead the country to prosperity. The revival of national consciousness will enable Ukraine to become a powerful state.” Only 7.4% disagree. Despite notable regional variation (85.5% in the West versus just over 60% in the East and South), patriotism and national consciousness remain a core value and a source of resistance across all regions.
Four out of five respondents (80%) agree with the statement: “Although there are many obstacles on the path to our statehood, I still believe that Ukraine must be an independent country.” While support for this principle has slightly decreased compared to 2023–2024 (when it exceeded 85%), it remains high. However, the regional differences are striking: only slightly more than half (51.8%) of respondents in the southern regions support this view, while nearly one-third (30.2%) are undecided.
- Public opinion has shifted on several key issues of the national agenda.
National Unity:
The share of respondents who believe that “Ukraine has become more united in resisting Russian aggression” has steadily declined with each year of the full-scale war—from over 63% in 2023 to nearly 56% in 2024, and down to just 51.9% in 2025. Meanwhile, those who disagree with the statement rose from 13.2% in 2023 to 23.1% in 2025.
The proportion of those who agree with the statement: “Those who fled the war abroad should stay there; they don’t deserve to live in Ukraine” more than doubled—from 14.5% in 2023 to nearly 31% in 2025.
Relations between internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities remain an area of latent tension. On one hand, more respondents now disagree (37.9%) than agree (32.1%) with the statement that relations between IDPs and locals are difficult and leave much to be desired (in 2023, the figures were the opposite: 27.7% vs. 39.1%). This may reflect the growing experience of interaction between people with diverse war-related experiences. On the other hand, since the start of the full-scale invasion, the proportion of those who feel that IDPs significantly impact their lives has doubled—from 14.4% to 29.8%. Among IDPs themselves, 43.4% believe that the host population significantly affects their current life situation. Notably, dissatisfaction with such influence reaches 100% across all groups.
European Integration: Support for the idea that “Ukraine is a European country and should move toward Europe” has significantly declined since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. In 2023, 76.3% of respondents agreed with this position, and only 6.5% disagreed. In 2025, fewer than 60% express such pro-European optimism, while one in six openly disagrees.
Residents of Ukraine’s southern regions are the least pro-European: only 32.4% support the European integration imperative, compared to 40.3% who do not, with 27.3% undecided. Paradoxically, attitudes in the West and East have reversed historically: three-quarters (74.3%) of respondents in the East now believe Ukraine is a European country and should move toward Europe, while in the West, this view is shared by less than half (48.2%). The reasons for this paradox are complex and may include changes in the social and demographic structure of the regions due to displacement and refugee movements, as well as differing experiences with mobilization campaigns.
- Respondents’ perceptions of peace and victory have shifted significantly:
Expectations for the war’s conclusion have notably declined, while views on the acceptable cost of peace have become increasingly polarized. At the same time, societal tolerance for draft evasion now exceeds the level of condemnation for such behavior.
On one hand, there is a growing consensus that “Ukraine needs peace, but not at any cost”—a view supported by 76.3% of respondents in 2025, compared to 66.6% in 2023. On the other hand, agreement with the idea that “A small shame is better than a big war” (37%) has once again surpassed the share of those who disagree (28.6%)—returning to pre-invasion levels. In 2023, this ratio was reversed: only 18.3% agreed, while 45.4% disagreed. Views on this perceived trade-off between disgrace through defeat and continued military resistance vary widely by region: in eastern Ukraine, over half (53.3%) agree that a small shame is better than a big war, while less than a third in central (28.7%) and southern (30.2%) regions share this view.
For the first time, support for a maximalist interpretation of victory—restoration of all occupied territories, including Donbas and Crimea—has dropped below 50% (48.5%) compared to 61.5% in 2023 and 59.1% in 2024. Support for this view is uneven across regions: just 43.1% of respondents in central regions and only 36.7% in eastern regions support full territorial restoration, while in the West and South it remains above 60%.
A more compromise-oriented view of future peace—withdrawal of Russian troops to the lines held prior to February 24, 2022, and the return of Crimea and Donbas through negotiations—is now supported by about 60% of respondents. This is a marked increase compared to 2023 (30.4%) and 2024 (39.4%).
The proportion of respondents who feel that those evading mobilization are understandable—“no one wants to die”—has slightly increased from 54% in 2024 to 58.5% in 2025. This level of tolerance significantly outweighs the share of those who say they feel ashamed of men hiding from mobilization (39%, down from 42.9% in 2024). Some respondents appear to both condemn and tolerate draft evasion simultaneously, reflecting a degree of ambivalence and internal conflict regarding mobilization.
These demobilizing tendencies in public opinion are partially offset by growing support for the restoration of Ukraine’s nuclear status. For the second consecutive year, over half of respondents agree that Ukraine should restore its nuclear capabilities to ensure its sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 2025, this share reached 57.1%—the highest recorded level to date.
- Respondents exhibit conflicting views regarding the current state of U.S.-Ukraine relations.
While the United States is still largely seen as Ukraine’s ally, President Donald Trump is increasingly perceived as aligned with Vladimir Putin. Public opinion is also divided over Ukraine’s ability to continue resisting Russian aggression without U.S. military aid.
Nearly half of respondents (47.9%) agree that despite Donald Trump’s unfriendly remarks toward Ukraine, the United States remains a stronghold of global democracy and Ukraine’s strategic partner. Only about one in five (18.7%) disagree with this assessment.
More than 22% of respondents would agree to provide the U.S. access to Ukraine’s rare earth metals in exchange for military aid. Less than half (45%) would oppose such an arrangement, while a full third (33%) remain undecided.
About 28% of respondents believe that “behind-the-scenes negotiations between the U.S. and Russia, along with worsening relations between Zelenskyy and Trump, make our hopes for victory and a just peace completely unrealistic.” However, this group is significantly smaller than those still unwilling to give up on the hope for a just peace (41.4%). Notably, such “defeatist” attitudes tied to the current U.S. political stance are three times more common in the West (36.9%) than in the South (12.9%).
There is also no clear consensus on whether Ukraine is capable of resisting Russian aggression without American military support. Only 27.7% believe Ukraine can manage without it, while 34.8% believe the opposite, and 37.3% are unsure. In the western regions, however, those confident in Ukraine’s independent capacity to resist (41.1%) outnumber both the skeptics (30.1%) and the undecided (28.8%).
- Political and Psychological Profiles of Potential Voters of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and Petro Poroshenko Differ Significantly
The political and psychological profiles of potential voters for Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and Petro Poroshenko differ notably across a range of indicators.
If presidential elections were to be held next Sunday due to the expiration of the current president’s term, 71.4% of respondents said they would definitely or most likely participate. Among all respondents, 24.5% would vote for Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 18% for Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and 8.4% for Petro Poroshenko. Another 11.5% would vote for other candidates, and 28.6% remain undecided.
Some of the starkest differences among supporters of the top three potential candidates—unsurprisingly—appear in their views on the current president and government. The statement “Our government is profiting from the war and sinking deeper into corruption” is supported by about 46% of Zelenskyy’s voters, while this sentiment is shared by about 75% of Zaluzhnyi and Poroshenko supporters. Conversely, 47% of Zelenskyy’s voters believe that “The current government is decisively cleaning out those who profit from the war and engage in corruption and other abuses.” Only 22.1% of Zaluzhnyi’s and 15.7% of Poroshenko’s supporters agree.
When asked whether “Ukraine is moving in the right direction,” over 60% of Zelenskyy’s voters agree, compared to 50% of Zaluzhnyi’s and only 37.5% of Poroshenko’s. Two-thirds (66%) of Zelenskyy supporters also believe that “Any protests against the government today should be avoided, as they weaken Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.” Among Zaluzhnyi and Poroshenko supporters, agreement with this view drops to 45% and 28.4%, respectively.
Differences are also evident in perceptions of U.S.-Ukraine relations and their impact on the course of the war. Among Zelenskyy’s supporters, 60.3% agree that “Despite Donald Trump’s unfriendly remarks, the United States remains a bulwark of global democracy and a strategic partner.” Only 42.2% of Poroshenko’s supporters share this view.
Zelenskyy’s voters are more likely to reject the notion that Trump’s return to office would render “Ukraine’s hopes for victory and a just peace entirely unrealistic”—with 56.8% disagreeing with that statement, compared to 42.2% of Zaluzhnyi’s and 44.6% of Poroshenko’s supporters. Interestingly, 40.8% of Zaluzhnyi’s supporters do not believe Ukraine is capable of resisting Russian aggression without U.S. military aid—one and a half times more than among Zelenskyy’s voters (27%).
Zelenskyy’s voters also show greater resistance to the idea of trading rare earth metals for military aid from the U.S.: 51.4% disagree that such an exchange would be fair, compared to 41.7% of Zaluzhnyi’s and 38.2% of Poroshenko’s voters.
At the same time, Zelenskyy’s voter base reveals internal contradictions. On one hand, three-quarters (74.8%) believe that Ukraine is a united country—significantly more than among Zaluzhnyi’s (50.9%) and Poroshenko’s (46.1%) supporters. On the other hand, they are more unforgiving toward Ukrainian refugees abroad: 38% of Zelenskyy’s voters believe that “those who fled the country do not deserve to live in Ukraine,” compared to 28.9% of Zaluzhnyi’s and 29.4% of Poroshenko’s supporters.
Zelenskyy’s supporters also hold more radical views on restoring Ukraine’s nuclear status—68.2% support nuclear rearmament (compared to 52.8% among Zaluzhnyi’s and 49.5% among Poroshenko’s voters). However, they are also more tolerant of draft evasion: 58.8% believe it is understandable (versus 52.3% of Zaluzhnyi’s and 47.5% of Poroshenko’s supporters).
Finally, 38.5% of Zelenskyy’s voters agree with the statement “A small shame is better than a big war,” while this view is held by only 26.6% of Zaluzhnyi’s supporters—suggesting a more pragmatic or war-weary orientation among Zelenskyy’s electoral base.
More data: https://ispp.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/dynamika-2025-byuleten.pdf