The survey was conducted by the Institute for Social and Political Psychology of the National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine in cooperation with the Association of Political Psychologists of Ukraine from March 1 to 15, 2024, using face-to-face interviews. A total of 2,000 respondents aged 18 and over were surveyed in areas under the control of the Government of Ukraine. The sample is representative of Ukraine’s adult population, with a margin of error of ±3.2%.
Regional differences in public opinion were analyzed based on a division of Ukraine into four macro-regions:
- Western region (Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi oblasts),
- Central region (Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv oblasts, and the city of Kyiv),
- Eastern region (Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Kharkiv oblasts),
- Southern region (Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Kherson oblasts).
The data is also differentiated by respondents’ political preferences, based on their answers to the question:
“If, due to the end of the current President’s term, presidential elections were to be held in Ukraine, and the listed candidates were running, who would you vote for?”
The combined share of respondents who selected Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, or Petro Poroshenko amounts to 53% of the sample.
The current survey results are compared with data collected in February 2022, just prior to the full-scale invasion.
Key Findings (for more detail, see the full Presentation)
- Public sentiment is shifting toward more pessimistic assessments of Ukraine’s present and future.
While these shifts are not drastic, they may indicate a gradual decline in the high psychological mobilization that characterized society in the initial years of the full-scale invasion.
Currently, more than half of respondents (56.1%) assess the socio-economic and political situation in Ukraine as bad or very bad, while only a quarter (24.6%) consider it normal or quite normal.
However, this distribution is not dramatically different from the results recorded in February 2022, just before the invasion, when 52.2% viewed the situation as bad or very bad, and 31.8% as normal or quite normal.
Residents of southern Ukraine are more likely than others to evaluate the situation negatively (62.1%). Among supporters of Zelenskyy, the share of negative assessments is lower (49%) compared to supporters of Zaluzhnyi (59.1%) and Poroshenko (64.3%).
Only one in four respondents (25%) expects the situation in the country to improve, while 42% believe things are more likely—or definitely—going to get worse.
A year ago, optimism outweighed pessimism (35% vs. 30%).
The highest share of optimistic expectations is found in the South (44.1%), while the lowest is in the Center (18.4%).
One in three respondents (33.8%) currently agrees that events in Ukraine are moving in the right direction—down significantly from 50.8% a year ago, but still higher than in 2022 (29.3%).
This view is most commonly held in the East (45.5%) and South (48.8%), as well as among Zelenskyy’s supporters (66.1%).
It is much less common in the Central region (23.4%) and among Poroshenko supporters (17.3%).
- A renewed wave of public criticism toward the government in general—and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in particular—has re-emerged, reversing the pause in criticism observed during the early months of the full-scale invasion.
This trend is especially evident when it comes to perceptions of corruption.
Currently, 70% of respondents agree with the statement that the government is profiting from the war and becoming increasingly mired in corruption—up from only 43% a year ago.
People in the East (57.5%) and supporters of President Zelenskyy (47.8%) are somewhat less critical on this issue.
- Despite tensions, Ukrainian society remains largely united on key national issues and in its resistance to Russian aggression.
Two-thirds of citizens (65.2%) reject the idea that Ukraine is “too diverse” to function as a single country—an increase from 61.5% in 2023 and close to the level in 2022 (67.6%).
At the same time, negative attitudes are becoming more pronounced toward fellow Ukrainians who left the country after the full-scale invasion began. Public tension is also fueled by concerns over open collaboration and latent loyalty to Russia among segments of the population.
A year ago, 35.6% of respondents agreed with the statement that Ukrainian refugees often tarnish Ukraine’s image in Europe, while 30.2% disagreed. Today, opinions have shifted significantly: 46.2% agree with this statement, and only 20.6% disagree.
The most negative attitudes toward refugees are found in the South and East of Ukraine.
One in four respondents now agrees that many Ukrainians see Russian soldiers as liberators—up from less than 15% last year. Only about 43% now disagree with this view, down from 58.7% in 2023.
More than 63% of respondents believe that anyone who collaborated with the enemy in temporarily occupied territories should be imprisoned without exception. Only 12% disagree.
The strictest stance is found in the West, where 70% support this position and only 7.6% oppose it. Respondents in the South are less categorical: 53.5% agree, while 24.4% disagree.
- For the first time since observations began, a majority of respondents support restoring Ukraine’s nuclear capability as a means of safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Over 50% agree with this position, while fewer than 15% oppose it, and 31.1% remain undecided.
Support is strongest in the South (nearly 75% in favor and 19% opposed) and the West (62% in favor, 6.8% opposed).
Among Zelenskyy supporters, 64.3% support restoring the nuclear arsenal, compared to fewer than 40% of Poroshenko supporters. - Public attitudes toward possible compromise solutions to end the war are beginning to shift.
A year ago, 30.4% of respondents agreed that a Ukrainian victory could be defined as the withdrawal of Russian troops from territories occupied since February 24, 2022, with Crimea and parts of Donbas to be negotiated later—while nearly 42% rejected this idea.
Today, the picture has nearly reversed: 39.4% agree with this vision of victory, while only 26.2% disagree.
- Public opinion on mobilization is highly conflicted.
On the one hand, more than half of respondents (53.9%) agree with the statement: “Those who avoid mobilization are understandable—nobody wants to die.”
Only 17.2% disagree, and around 29% are undecided.
The greatest level of tolerance is found in the South, where over 70% believe that draft evasion is understandable.
At the same time, nearly 43% of respondents say they feel ashamed of men who hide from mobilization—with the figure approaching 50% among residents of southern oblasts.
The contradictory public attitudes toward mobilization—evident both at the societal level and in the minds of individual citizens—pose a serious challenge for the country’s military and political leadership and will require the use of psychologically informed measures to ensure effective mobilization.
More data: https://ispp.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/bul032024.pdf